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Using the WTO for the Protection of Human Rights in China?
PHIL CW CHAN*
Abstract
The question of the conflict and commensurability between human rights and trade 
has received an abundance of scholarly attention (and mass protests) in the past 
two decades. Many human rights advocates believe that liberalisation of trade 
regulations causes and contributes to human rights abuses and violations, whilst 
trade advocates believe that enhanced international trade provides benefits and op-
portunities and a generally higher standard of living especially in developing coun-
tries. With China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation in December 2001, 
the significance and immediacy of the relationship between human rights and trade 
has become ever more pronounced, as the human rights situation in China contin-
ues to be unfavourable. This article examines the notion and development of human 
rights in China, whether the WTO is legally capable of impacting the development 
and enforcement of human rights in China through its compulsory dispute resolu-
tion and enforcement mechanisms and its provision for trade sanctions and  whether 
it is indeed desirable for the WTO to do so.
The question of the conflict and commensurability between human rights and trade 
has received an abundance of scholarly attention (and mass protests) in the past 
two decades. On one hand, many human rights advocates believe that liberalisation 
of trade regulations causes or contributes to human rights abuses and violations, 
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including exploitation of labour, especially child labour, unemployment and sub-
stantial reductions in wages and salaries caused by competition as well as a gen-
eral deterioration of living conditions for the poor, and they are further troubled by 
the apparent lack of democracy, equity and transparency within institutions such 
as the World Trade Organisation (WTO). On the other hand, trade advocates be-
lieve that enhanced international trade provides access to previously unexplored or 
under-explored markets, increased economic incentives and employment opportuni-
ties caused by competition leading to a generally higher standard of living espe-
cially in developing countries, increased awareness of human rights and enhanced 
scrutiny against their violations, and increased understanding and interdependence 
between and amongst countries and regions which in turn reduces the desirability 
and probability of military confrontation. As the United States de-linked human 
rights and trade in its relations with China by extending it unconditional most-fa-
voured nation status (or permanent normal trade relations)1 in September 2000 and 
thereby removing after almost fifteen years of negotiations the final hurdle in Chi-
na’s accession to the WTO, which ultimately took place on 11 December 2001, the 
significance and immediacy of the relationship between human rights and trade has 
become ever more pronounced, as the human rights situation in China continues to 
be unfavourable. Whilst ‘human rights’ are not explicitly mentioned in the 1994 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation,2 the contracting 
parties in the first preambular paragraph of the Agreement recognise that:
their relations in the fi eld of trade and economic endeavour should be con-
ducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment 
and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, 
and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allow-
ing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objec-
tive of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the 
environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent 
with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic devel-
opment…3
There are, of course, other factors and issues in addition to human rights that 
one ought to take into account when examining multilateral or bilateral trade with 
China, depending on the particular country and region concerned. In this article, I 
will examine the notion and development of human rights in China. I will then 
1 Public Law 106–286: US-China Relations Act of 2000, s 101; see also Executive Order: Normal 
Trade Relations Treatment, proclaimed by President George W Bush on 27 December 2001.
2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying 
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, done at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994, 33 ILM 
1125 (1994), Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation.
3 Ibid, fi rst preambular paragraph.
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discuss whether the WTO is legally capable of impacting the development and 
enforcement of human rights in China through its compulsory dispute resolution 
and enforcement mechanisms and its provision for trade sanctions, and whether it 
is indeed desirable for the WTO to do so.
I. Human Rights: The Chinese Perspective and Approach
Maxime Tardu argues that for a State and its government to be pressured into 
improving the human rights situation within its jurisdiction:
The many factors at work included, fi rst and foremost, an awareness of their 
dignity by the persons concerned, under the infl uence of national human rights 
defence groups; international pressure exerted by NGOs; bilateral inter-state 
deterrence, in varying forms and degrees; diplomatic representations, measures 
of cultural and political isolation, withdrawal of economic and technical assis-
tance, commercial boycott; the positions adopted by churches and religious 
groups; the implementation of complaints procedures at regional level (Coun-
cil of Europe, the Organization of American States (OAS)) and within the sec-
toral framework of the specialised agencies of the United Nations, in particular 
ILO; and lastly, the activities of the United Nations.4
With millennia of cultural heritage, an analysis on human rights in China, including 
this one, must therefore be informed with an understanding of the cultural values 
pertaining to China and Chinese society, in order to examine whether the popula-
tion is supportive, ambivalent or in fact hostile to human rights development, and 
Shalom Schwartz maintains that ‘[t]he commonalities in the intentional and unin-
tentional value socialization to which different members of society are exposed 
reflect the cultural emphases that support and maintain the social, economic, and 
political system of the society.’5 At the same time, however, it must be kept in mind 
that it is invariably the case that ‘powerful individuals and groups tend to mo-
nopolize the interpretation of cultural norms and manipulate them to their own 
advantage.’6
4 Maxime Tardu, “The Effectiveness of United Nations Methods and Mechanisms in the Field of 
Human Rights: A Critical Overview” in Status Preparatory of Publications, Studies and Documents for 
the World Conference: Report of the Secretary General (11 April 1993), World Conference on Human 
Rights Preparatory Committee, 4th Session, Provisional Agenda Item 5, 37, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.157/
PC/60/Add.5.
5 Shalom H Schwartz, “Cultural Dimensions of Values: Toward an Understanding of National Dif-
ferences” in Uichol Kim, Harry C Triandis, Cigdem Kagitcibasi, Sang-Chin Choi, and Gene Yoon 
(eds), Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method, and Application (Thousand Oaks, California: 
Sage, 1994), p 85, 92.
6 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, “Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defi ning International Stand-
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Whilst not a religion as such and indeed ‘thoroughly secular’,7 Confucianism, 
embodying the teachings of Confucius, as a philosophy of life is pervasive in the 
social, political, moral and juristic fabrics of society and governance in East Asia, 
and especially amongst the Chinese. William Gabrenya and Kwang-Kuo Hwang 
note that ‘Confucian concepts are employed both in an analytical, abstract, philo-
sophical sense and as a useful heuristic for describing the professed values of Chi-
nese people.’8
 In particular, the institution of family is central to Confucianism, with the 
notion of fi lial piety controlling all social thoughts and interactions as well as pro-
viding moral guidance. In his famous 1994 interview in Foreign Affairs,9 Lee Kuan 
Yew, then Senior Minister and now Minister Mentor of Singapore, declared that 
‘the tested norm is the family unit. It is the building brick of society.’10 Although 
obedience and deference to authority is similarly expected of in other cultures, fi l-
ial piety, social psychologist David Ho fi nds, ‘surpasses all other ethics in its his-
torical continuity, the proportion of humanity under its governance, and the 
encompassing and imperative nature of its precepts. The attributes of intergenera-
tional relationships governed by fi lial piety are structural, enduring, and invariable 
across situations within Chinese culture.’11 Thus, fi lial piety constitutes ‘a guiding 
principle governing generational Chinese patterns of socialization, as well as spe-
cifi c rules of intergenerational conduct, applicable throughout the length of one’s 
life span’,12 and disregard for or violation of one’s fi lial obligations entails the only 
form of sin, and attendant condemnation, in the Chinese culture.
 Not only do these fi lial obligations guide familial interactions, but they also 
provide and constitute the framework against which authority in all generalities and 
circumstances is to be understood and observed, and the institution of the family 
has always been viewed by the Chinese as the microscopic state. The relationship 
and obligations between father and son are closely analogous to that between ruler 
and the ruled, save that one’s obligations to the state take precedence over those 
to one’s father in the event of a confl ict. Respect for authority is expected of those 
in inferior positions without exception, by their superiors in the respective hierar-
chies for whose positions they must simultaneously, quietly and conscientiously 
strive, and individuals are culturally engrained to regard as their ultimate purpose 
not serving their own aims and ideals but those of their parents and, above all, the 
ards of Human Rights” in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im (ed), Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspec-
tives: A Quest for Consensus (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), pp 19, 27–28. 
7 William K Gabrenya, Jr, and Kwang-Kuo Hwang, “Chinese Social Interaction: Harmony and Hier-
archy on the Good Earth”, in Michael Harris Bond (ed), The Handbook of Chinese Psychology (Hong 
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996), 309, 310.
8 Ibid, 309.
9 Fareed Zakaria, “Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew” (1994) 73(2) Foreign 
Affairs, 109.
10 Ibid, 113.
11 David YF Ho, “Filial Piety and Its Psychological Consequences” in Bond, supra n 7, 155, 155.
12 Ibid.
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state. As Henry Rosemont observes, ‘[f]or the early Confucians there can be no me 
in isolation, to be considered abstractly; I am the totality of roles I live in relation 
to specifi c others. I do not play or perform these roles; I am these roles. When they 
have all been specifi ed I have been defi ned uniquely, fully, and altogether, with no 
remainder with which to piece together a free, autonomous self.’13 It is this differ-
ence of the relationship between the individual and the state that has given rise to 
the mutual incomprehension and unease between China and Western countries, 
where individual rights and freedoms hold sway.
The notion of human rights, with its inherent individualistic, legalistic and con-
frontational nature, is thus traditionally viewed by the Chinese people, and not just 
the government, as hedonistic and suspicious, and to insist upon or advocate their 
legal recognition and enforcement is to be uncomprehended and abhorred, for the 
reason that ‘Confucianism emphasizes that a genuine community is not composed 
of mutually disinterested egoistic individuals, but is composed of virtuous mem-
bers thinking of shared goals and values over one’s own. … In this ideal commu-
nity, the highest moral virtue is jen [ren] (benevolence) when expressed in an active 
form; “overcoming one’s selfi shness” in a passive form.’14 Such insistence upon 
harmony and respect also extends to the business setting, where guanxi, ie, amica-
ble relationship, and mianzi, ie, face, are omnipotent, and those alien to the Con-
fucian culture and engrained in their own culture of strict legalism are invariably 
surprised as they fi nd out that business transactions with the Chinese are not and 
cannot be perceived as one-off contractual instances but must be premised upon 
long-term trust and amicability, even if the Westerner harbours contrary feelings 
which then must be concealed.
It is therefore not surprising that in a survey of seven hundred Beijing residents 
in December 1995, more than 95 per cent of the respondents either agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement that they ‘would rather live in an orderly soci-
ety than in a freer society which is prone to disruptions’.15 Analysis of the same 
survey also pointed to wide support for the current regime in China.16 Together 
with the enculturation in Confucianism which regards rights as not inherent in 
humanity but ‘[fl owing] from the state in the form of a gratuitous grant that can be 
subjected to conditions or abrogation by the unilateral decision of the state’,17 it is 
13 Henry Rosemont, Jr, “Why Take Rights Seriously? A Confucian Critique” in Leroy Rouner 
(ed), Human Rights and the World’s Religions (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1988), pp 167, 177.
14 Lee Seung-hwan, “Was There a Concept of Rights in Confucian Virtue-Based Morality?” (1992) 
19 Journal of Chinese Philosophy 241, 252.
15 Yang Zhong, Jie Chen, and John M Scheb, II, “Political Views from Below: A Survey of Beijing 
Residents’” (1997) 30 PS: Political Science and Politics 474, 476. The response rate was 97 per cent.
16 Jie Chen, Yang Zhong, and Jan William Hillard, “The Level and Sources of Popular Support for 
China’s Current Political Regime” (1997) 30 Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45.
17 R Randle Edwards, “Civil and Social Rights: Theory and Practice in Chinese Law Today” in 
R Randle Edwards, Louis Henkin, and Andrew J Nathan (eds), Human Rights in Contemporary China 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp 41, 44–45.
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fair to infer that the economic progress and benefi ts brought to the Chinese popu-
lation by China’s increased trade with other countries and the additional political 
prestige by its accession to the WTO have augmented the general contentment of 
the Chinese population with its leaders. Thus, when seeking to foster the develop-
ment and enforcement of human rights in China, one must heed Ann Kent’s cau-
tion that ‘[i]n pitting the sovereignty and national prestige of one state against 
another they may have the counter-productive effect of mobilizing the very citi-
zenry whose human rights are being abused in support of the abusing state.’18
Nonetheless, as the Chinese government continues to justify its leadership by 
claiming a morally superior status, the Chinese population as it becomes more affl u-
ent and aware has begun to take note of its repressive rule. Furthermore, as Joseph 
Chan argues convincingly, ‘[h]uman rights does not depend on the notion that 
human beings are egoistic, totally unconcerned with the well-being of others. 
Human rights protect legitimate interests of individuals. We must distinguish 
between “self-interest” and “selfi sh interests”. For example, people have a self-in-
terest in not being tortured or raped, but this interest is obviously not selfi sh.’19
Indeed, China does not deny the validity of international human rights norms, 
particularly as it realises that mechanisms are lacking for their effective enforce-
ment. Rather, China denies that it has violated human rights or committed human 
rights abuses, relies on the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention and 
refers to the human rights abuses and violations that occur in Western countries 
vocal in their critique of the human rights situation in China, in particular the 
United States, as evidencing their hypocrisy and attempt at frustrating China’s 
ascendancy to leading power status. By insisting that it respects human rights, 
China portrays itself as a great power that abides by international law, including 
international human rights law.
At the same time, however, seeing itself as spokesperson for developing coun-
tries, China challenges human rights’ claim of universality, especially in their appli-
cation, and the bias in international human rights discourse in favour of civil and 
political rights over economic, social and cultural rights at the expense of and 
neglecting the peculiar needs of developing countries. In its 1991 White Paper 
‘Human Rights in China’,20 the Chinese government maintained:
China is in favor of strengthening international cooperation in the realm of 
human rights on the basis of mutual understanding and seeking a common 
ground while reserving differences. However, no country in its effort to real-
18 Ann Kent, “China and the International Human Rights Regime: A Case Study of Multilateral 
Monitoring, 1989–1994” (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 1.
19 Joseph Chan, “A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China” in Joanne R 
Bauer and Daniel A Bell (eds), The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), at 212, 219.
20 Information Offi ce of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, November 1991, full 
text available at http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/7/index.htm (last accessed at 3 March 2008).
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ize and protect human rights can take a route that is divorced from its history 
and its economic, political and cultural realities. … It is also noted in the res-
olution of the 46th conference on human rights that no single mode of devel-
opment is applicable to all cultures and peoples. It is neither proper nor 
feasible for any country to judge other countries by the yardstick of its own 
mode or to impose its own mode on others. Therefore, the purpose of interna-
tional protection of human rights and related activities should be to promote 
normal cooperation in the international fi eld of human rights and international 
harmony, mutual understanding and mutual respect. Consideration should be 
given to the differing views on human rights held by countries with different 
political, economic and social systems, as well as different historical, religious 
and cultural backgrounds. International human rights activities should be car-
ried on in the spirit of seeking common ground while reserving differences, 
mutual respect, and the promotion of understanding and cooperation.21
China’s claims, however, are fraught with contradictions. First of all, for Beijing 
to make such a public pronouncement that it is in favour of human rights notwith-
standing its simultaneous reservations demonstrates that Beijing is aware that the 
reality must be otherwise, and in denying rather than justifying its human rights 
abuses and violations, Beijing is failing ‘according not to alien western principles 
but to China’s own standards’.22 In dismissing human rights as Western-oriented 
by relying on state sovereignty as justification for its human rights ‘shortcomings’, 
Beijing is also asserting a principle founded in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, a 
Western treaty peculiar to Western nation-states. In the process, Beijing overlooks 
the historical fact that the notion of state sovereignty was foreign to imperial China 
as the Middle Kingdom with all neighbouring countries under its tutelage. Its claim 
of entitlement to the right to self-determination, which it simultaneously denies 
Hong Kong23 amongst others, also relies on a Western right premised upon self and 
autonomy and fundamentally adverse to Confucianism, a right that originated from 
Woodrow Wilson which was eventually recognised as erga omnes by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice24 to whose compulsory jurisdiction China does not submit.25 
21 Ibid, X. Active Participation in International Human Rights Activities.
22 RP Peerenboom, “What’s Wrong with Chinese Rights?: Toward a Theory of Rights with Chinese 
Characteristics” (1993) 6 Harvard Human Rights Journal 29, 52.
23 For a discussion on Hong Kong’s political autonomy and its continuing struggle for universal 
suffrage, see Phil CW Chan, “Hong Kong’s Political Autonomy and its Continuing Struggle for Uni-
versal Suffrage” [2006] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 285.
24 Case concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia), ICJ Reports 1995, 90, 102.
25 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art 36(2). Nevertheless, the International Court of 
Justice did point out in East Timor, ibid, that ‘the erga omnes character of a norm and the rule of con-
sent to jurisdiction are two different things. Whatever the nature of the obligations invoked, the Court 
could not rule on the lawfulness of the conduct of a State when its judgment would imply an evalua-
tion of the lawfulness of the conduct of another State which is not a party to the case. Where this is so, 
the Court cannot act, even if the right in question is a right erga omnes.’
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Last but not least, China has voluntarily committed itself to the principles and 
 ideals of major United Nations human rights treaties and resolutions, including the 
United Nations Charter,26 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,27 the Inter-
national Bill of Rights,28 and the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women,29 and the fact that other (Western) countries have 
also disregarded or violated the human rights of their own citizens is not sufficient 
or satisfactory justification for China’s poor human rights record, especially given 
China’s staunch advocacy for cultural relativism and its claim to cultural superior-
ity.
In its human rights dialogues with other (Western) countries and in multilateral 
fora, China invariably maintains that as a developing country it must fi rst and fore-
most further and fulfi l its citizens’ right to subsistence in priority over their civil 
and political rights. In particular, China relies on Article 2(1) of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in arguing that it must be 
allowed suffi cient time and latitude in developing the general living conditions–
which, we note, encompass economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights–in 
China through economic development. The provision states that ‘[e]ach State Party 
to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through interna-
tional assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the max-
imum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate 
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.’30 In its General 
Comment No 3 on the nature of States parties’ obligations under the Covenant,31 
the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states:
The concept of progressive realization constitutes a recognition of the fact that 
full realization of all economic, social and cultural rights will generally not be 
able to be achieved in a short period of time. In this sense the obligation dif-
fers signifi cantly from that contained in article 2 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights which embodies an immediate obligation to 
respect and ensure all of the relevant rights. Nevertheless, the fact that realiza-
tion over time, or in other words progressively, is foreseen under the Covenant 
26 Signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945 and entered into force on 24 October 1945.
27 Adopted and proclaimed by UN GA Res 217A(III) of 10 December 1948.
28 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for sig-
nature, ratifi cation and accession by UN GA Res 2200A(XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered into 
force on 23 March 1976; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and opened for 
signature, ratifi cation and accession by UN GA Res 2200A(XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered 
into force on 3 January 1976.
29 Adopted and opened for signature, ratifi cation and accession by UN GA Res 34/180 of 18 Decem-
ber 1979 and entered into force on 3 September 1981.
30 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art 2(1).
31 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 3: The 
Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art 2 para 1) (14 December 1990), UN Doc.E/1991/23.
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should not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of all meaningful con-
tent. It is on the one hand a necessary fl exibility device, refl ecting the realities 
of the real world and the diffi culties involved for any country in ensuring full 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights. On the other hand, the 
phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison 
d’être of the Covenant which is to establish clear obligations for States parties 
in respect of the full realization of the rights in question. It thus imposes an 
obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that 
goal. Moreover, any deliberately retrogressive measures in that regard would 
require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justifi ed by 
reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the 
context of the full use of the maximum available resources.32
Here, China is not alone in arguing that human rights discourse has been biased in 
favour of civil and political rights to the detriment of economic, social and cul-
tural rights. In its statement to the World Conference on Human Rights held in 
Vienna in 1993, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated 
that ‘[t]he shocking reality … is that States and the international community as a 
whole continue to tolerate all too often breaches of economic, social and cultural 
rights which, if they occurred in relation to civil and political rights, would provoke 
expressions of horror and outrage and would lead to concerted calls for immediate 
action. In effect, despite the rhetoric, violations of civil and political rights con-
tinue to be treated as though they were far more serious, and more patently intoler-
able, than massive and direct denials of economic, social and cultural rights.’33 
Whilst the eventual 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action34 reaf-
firmed that ‘[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated’,35 Audrey Chapman points out that issues relating to the progressive 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights were left unaddressed in almost 
the entire rest of the Declaration and Programme.36
However, it has not been substantiated that economic, social and cultural rights 
and civil and political rights are mutually exclusive or that economic, social and 
cultural rights will be realised if civil and political rights are to be ignored. The 
universality, indivisibility, interdependence and inter-relatedness of all human 
32 Ibid, para 9.
33 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report on its Seventh Ses-
sion (23 November–11 December 1992), UN Doc.E/1993/22, Annex III: Statement to the World Confer-
ence on Human Rights on Behalf of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, para 5.
34 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action, adopted by acclamation on 25 June 1993, UN Doc.A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), 32 ILM 1661 
(1993).
35 Ibid, para 5.
36 Audrey R Chapman, “A “Violations Approach” for Monitoring the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 23, 24–25, note 3.
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rights indicated in the Vienna Declaration and Programme may now be taken as a 
norm of customary international law binding on all States. Speaking in the context 
of the European Convention on Human Rights,37 the European Court of Human 
Rights in Airey v Ireland38 stated that even ‘[w]hilst the Convention sets forth what 
are essentially civil and political rights, many of them have implications of a social 
or economic nature. The Court therefore considers … that the mere fact that an 
interpretation of the Convention may extend into the sphere of social and economic 
rights should not be a decisive factor against such an interpretation; there is no 
water-tight division separating that sphere from the field covered by the 
Convention.’39 The 2000 Human Development Report comprehensively explained 
the close correlations both between human development and human rights and 
between economic, social and cultural rights and civil and political rights, and Chi-
na’s handling of the severe acute respiratory syndrome between its outbreak in its 
territory in 2002 and its spread to Hong Kong and other countries in 2003 vividly 
demonstrated the importance of civil and political rights including the freedom of 
the press in the protection of all human rights including the right to health.
Illustrating the commensurability between civil and political rights and economic 
development in East Asia, Inoue Tatsuo refers to Japan’s post-World War II democ-
racy and economic development and maintains that the argument put forward by 
China and developing countries in Asia, that on account of their relative dearth of 
wealth and their more urgent need for economic development they should not be 
held to developed countries’ human rights standards, is self-defeating in their quest 
for equal respect on the global stage as it ‘suppresses or rationalizes abominable 
Western practices past and present, such as colonialism, slavery, racism, fascism, 
anticommunist crusades (McCarthyism, Vietnam War), and so on.’40 With human 
rights starting to develop in Western countries only after World War II, the Orien-
talist dualism inherent in the argument by China and other like-minded Asian coun-
tries thus ‘traps the West as well as Asia in a distorted perception of self-identity’41 
which stereotypes Asia as fundamentally inferior to the West and which only serves 
as ‘an epistemological device for guaranteeing Western hegemony over Asia’.42
Furthermore, the existence of admitted bias in human rights discourse in favour 
of civil and political rights to the detriment of economic, social and cultural rights 
37 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done at Rome and 
opened for signature on 4 November 1950 and entered into force on 3 September 1953. The Conven-
tion was subsequently amended by Protocol No 11, done at Strasbourg and opened for signature on 11 
May 1994 and entered into force on 1 November 1998, to the effect the then supervisory mechanism, 
consisting of a European Court of Human Rights and a European Commission of Human Rights, be 
restructured and replaced with a single and permanent European Court of Human Rights. 
38 (1979) 2 EHRR 305.
39 Ibid, para 26.
40 Inoue Tatsuo, “Liberal Democracy and Asian Orientalism”, in Bauer and Bell, supra n 19, 27, 
41.
41 Ibid, 42.
42 Ibid, 39.
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does not mean that China protects economic, social and cultural rights. With law 
in China ‘being conceived of as an instrument of the ruler’,43 it has been pointed 
out that although China has improved its legal system, in particular with a pleth-
ora of legislation, ‘the over-arching principle is still legal instrumentalism. It is fair 
to argue that the feature of this legalism is the use of liberal language, rhetoric, and 
the ritual of law to pursue distinctly illiberal political and social objectives; it is 
the rule through law rather than the rule of law.’44 It is not surprising that China 
possesses similar attitudes towards international law: instead of being normative 
and principles- and rules-based, international law should serve China’s foreign pol-
icy goals and interests as well as be compatible with its domestic concerns and pol-
icies (although, it must be added, all other states see international law from the 
same lens). Beijing’s approach also stems from and refl ects China’s historical expe-
rience with international law which, with the numerous unequal treaties forced upon 
China, the foreign partitioning of Chinese territory and the capitulation of Chinese 
sovereignty through concessions to foreign demands for extra-territorial jurisdic-
tion, can only have been negative.
Embedded in Confucianism, China’s insistence on the importance of its eco-
nomic development and its argument that (Western) insistence on civil and politi-
cal rights is meant to dilute China’s comparative advantage in external trade from 
low-wage employment also casts human life as a means to an end rather than as 
an end in itself and deprives human rights of their intrinsicality. The Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has indicated that ‘a minimum core obli-
gation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of 
each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State 
party in which any signifi cant number of individuals is deprived of essential food-
stuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most 
basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under 
the Covenant. If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish 
such a minimum core obligation, it would largely be deprived of its raison d’être.’45 
However, despite the rapid economic development and the accumulation of remark-
able wealth in major cities and particular households in China, the vast majority of 
the Chinese population continue to live below the poverty line with no access to 
any of the welfare and benefi ts the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights has indicated. In fact, the effects of Confucianism, in particular the omnip-
otence of guanxi and mianzi in business and personal relationships, bureaucratic 
interference, and general ignorance of public policies and one’s contractual rights 
and obligations, have all contributed to and perpetuated the undermining of prop-
erty and contractual rights in China. Together with these factors, the Chinese judi-
43 Qingjiang Kong, “China’s WTO Accession: Commitments and Implications” (2000) 3 Journal of 
International Economic Law 655, 683–84.
44 Ibid, 684.
45 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 3, 
supra n 31, para 10.
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ciary’s traditional concern with penal and not civil matters and its emphasis on 
substantive laws rather than procedures leads to civil judgments frequently unexe-
cuted.46
Meanwhile, as Virginia Leary points out, workers’ rights in a country are a good 
indicator of the level of protection of human rights in general,47 as workers consti-
tute the bedrock of a society and if their rights are not recognised and protected in 
a particular country then it is improbable that human rights in general are recogn-
ised and protected in that country. In her study on labour standards and human 
rights under China’s market socialism, Anita Chan has demonstrated that the labour 
rights of tens of millions of Chinese workers are systematically ignored, under-
mined or violated,48 often physically through forced and bonded labour, control of 
bodily functions including toileting, corporal punishment, and violence.49 Viola-
tions of labour rights and standards are particularly acute for those citizens who 
seek to take part in China’s economic development by moving to China’s major 
cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, as they are subjected to ‘immi-
gration’ controls under China’s household registration system and are viewed by 
the bureaucracy and the existing urban populations as both a threat to stability and 
a source of criminality and diseases. In addition, it was the injustice and corrup-
tion of their managers which many workers in China felt to resemble the state 
bureaucracy that led them to fi nd resonance with and join a student movement 
which culminated in the tragic Tiananmen Square suppression,50 and Leary notes 
that the Chinese government was in fact more alarmed at workers’ demand for the 
right to organise and participate in labour unions than at the students’ call for 
democracy per se.51
Last but not least, although traditionally aligned with civil and political rights, 
the principle of equality and non-discrimination, from which all human rights 
derive and evolve, have ‘always had pertinence to economic, social and cultural 
rights’.52 Unfortunately, patriarchal attitudes towards women and children, based 
on the precept of fi lial piety, continue to pervade Chinese laws and society, and 
China’s penal one-child policy has led to innumerable children, particularly female 
children, being denied birth registration, causing their offi cial non-existence which 
46 See Donald C Clarke, “The Execution of Civil Judgments in China” (1995) 141 China Quarterly: 
Special Issue on China’s Legal Reforms 65, 69–70.
47 Virginia A Leary, “The Paradox of Workers’ Rights as Human Rights” in Lance A Compa and 
Stephen F Diamond (eds), Human Rights, Labor Rights, and International Trade (Philadelphia: Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), at 21, 22.
48 Anita Chan, “Labor Standards and Human Rights: The Case of Chinese Workers under Market 
Socialism” (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 886.
49 Ibid, 890–91 and 894–97.
50 Andrew G Walder, “Workers, Managers and the State: The Reform Era and the Political Crisis of 
1989” (1991) 127 China Quarterly: Special Issue on The Individual and State in China 467.
51 Leary, supra n 47, 23.
52 Scott Leckie, “Another Step towards Indivisibility: Identifying the Key Features of Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 81, 104–05.
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entails their complete lack of access to any state welfare and benefi ts including 
education, access to health facilities and protection from crimes including infanti-
cide and forced prostitution.
II. Protection of Human Rights in China through the WTO and its Trade 
Sanctions?
As Louis Henkin observes, ‘[e]nforcement has always been seen as the weak link 
in the international legal system, and it is surely the weak link of international 
human rights law.’53 Although Article 41 of the United Nations Charter provides 
that the United Nations Security Council may impose non-military sanctions for 
the implementation of its decisions,54 it is improbable that as a Permanent Member 
of the Council with veto power China will ever face its sanctions. Many therefore 
believe that the WTO with its compulsory dispute settlement and enforcement 
mechanisms may be able to exert pressures on China for the observance of inter-
national human rights law, as it is surmised that China cares about its economic 
development and trade relations with other countries. In particular, trade sanctions 
may be invoked against China under the framework of the WTO if labour rights 
and standards have been disregarded in the production in its territory of a good 
that another WTO Member may import, such as through the exploitation of child 
labour.
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann argues that ‘[h]uman rights law offers WTO rules 
moral, constitutional, and democratic legitimacy far beyond the traditional eco-
nomic and utilitarian justifi cations.’55 The WTO possesses an international legal 
personality of its own56 and Article III(2) of the Marrakesh Agreement expressly 
provides that the Organisation ‘shall provide the forum for negotiations among its 
Members concerning their multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under 
the agreements in the Annexes to this Agreement [and] may also provide a forum 
for further negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade rela-
tions, and a framework for the implementation of the result of such negotiations, 
as may be decided by the Ministerial Conference.’57 In his report to the fi fty-fi fth 
53 Louis Henkin, “Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”” (1996) 25 Georgia Journal of Interna-
tional and Comparative Law 31, 41.
54 Article 41 of the United Nations Charter states that ‘[t]he Security Council may decide what 
measures not involving the use of armed forces are to be employed to give effects to its decisions, and 
it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include com-
plete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.’
55 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “The WTO Constitution and Human Rights” (2000) 3 Journal of Inter-
national Economic Law 19, 24.
56 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Art VIII(1).
57 Ibid, Art III(2).
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session of the United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Secretary-Gen-
eral Kofi  Annan stated that:
The goals and principles of the WTO Agreements and those of human rights 
do therefore share much in common. Goals of economic growth, increasing 
living standards, full employment and the optimal use of the world’s resources 
are conducive to the promotion of human rights, in particular the right to devel-
opment. Parallels can also be drawn between the principles of fair competition 
and non-discrimination under trade law and equality and non-discrimination 
under human rights law. Further, the special and differential treatment offered 
to developing countries under the WTO rules refl ects notions of affi rmative 
action under human rights law. 58
Under Article XX of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade59 as incor-
porated into the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,60 ‘[s]ubject to the 
requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute 
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing 
in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by 
any contracting party of measures: (a) necessary to protect public morals; … (e) 
relating to the products of child labour…’61 Article XIV(a) of the 1994 General 
Agreement on Trade in Services62 likewise permits a contracting party to adopt or 
enforce measures in the necessary protection of public morals or maintenance of 
public order.63
Whilst the term ‘trade sanctions’ is not used in the WTO Agreement, Article 
22(2) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding64 states that in the event of a fail-
ure of a Member to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a WTO rule 
into conformity or to comply with the recommendations and rulings by the WTO 
Panel or Appellate Body within a reasonable period of time, then that Member shall 
58 Globalization and its Impact on the Full Employment of All Human Rights: Preliminary Report 
of the Secretary-General (31 August 2000), 55th Session, UN Doc.A/55/342, 4.
59 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, adopted on 30 October 1947 at the conclusion of the 
Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employ-
ment at Havana and entered into force on 1 January 1948.
60 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra n 2, Annex 1A: General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade, paras 1(a) and 1(b).
61 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art XX.
62 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra n 2, Annex 1B: General Agreement on 
Trade in Services.
63 Nevertheless, in a footnote to Article XIV(a) it is immediately clarifi ed that ‘[t]he public order 
exception may be invoked only where a genuine and suffi ciently serious threat is posed to one of the 
fundamental interests of society.’
64 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra n 2, Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
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‘enter into negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute settlement pro-
cedures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation’, failing 
which ‘any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request 
authorization from the Dispute Settlement Body to suspend the application to the 
Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered 
agreements.’65 The WTO Appellate Body has indicated that ‘a Member has broad 
discretion in deciding whether to bring a case against another Member under the 
DSU. The language of Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994 and of Article 3.7 of the 
DSU suggests, furthermore, that a Member is expected to be largely self-regula-
tory in deciding whether any such action would be “fruitful”.’66
 An examination of the WTO Agreement, however, reveals that it will not be 
lawful for the WTO to enlarge its own jurisdiction by taking into account or enforc-
ing principles, rules and obligations established outside the framework of the WTO 
in its dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms. Seeking to strengthen the 
multilateral trading system, Article 23(1) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
stipulates that ‘[w]hen Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or 
other nullifi cation or impairment of benefi ts under the covered agreements or an 
impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall 
have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.’67 
Article 23(2) requires that ‘[i]n such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that ben-
efi ts have been nullifi ed or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of 
the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute 
settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, 
and shall make any such determination consistent with the fi ndings contained 
in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the [Dispute Settlement Body] 
or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period 
of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rul-
ings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspen-
sion of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accor-
dance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obliga-
tions under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member 
concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reason-
able period of time.68
65 Ibid, Art 22(2).
66 European Communities–Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Report of 
the Appellate Body (9 September 1997), WTO Doc.WT/DS27/AB/R, para 135.
67 Dispute Settlement Understanding, Art 23(1).
68 Ibid, Art 23(2).
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Article 19(1) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding indicates that ‘[w]here a 
panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered 
agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into 
conformity with that agreement. In addition to its recommendations, the panel or 
Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could imple-
ment the recommendations.’69 Article 19(2), however, points out that ‘[i]n accor-
dance with paragraph 2 of Article 3, in their findings and recommendations, the 
panel and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements.’70
However, whilst the WTO Agreement must not be read ‘in clinical isolation 
from public international law’,71 it remains the case, as Gabrielle Marceau points 
out, that:
The WTO adjudicating bodies are not courts of general jurisdiction and they 
cannot interpret and apply all treaties involving WTO Members, as states. Oth-
erwise, WTO adjudicating bodies would end up ‘interpreting’ human rights 
treaties. … The covered agreements are explicitly listed, and it cannot be pre-
sumed that members wanted to provide the WTO remedial system to enforce 
obligations and rights other than those listed in the WTO treaty. WTO adjudi-
cating bodies cannot give direct effect to human rights in any way that would 
set aside or amend a WTO provision. If they were to allow a non-WTO pro-
vision on human rights to supersede and set aside a WTO provision and there-
fore to give a legal effect to and enforce a non-WTO provision in superseding 
a WTO provision, they would be adding to or diminishing the WTO covered 
agreements (or amending them).72
It is important, nevertheless, to keep in mind that the lack of jurisdiction for the 
WTO to take into account and enforce human rights norms in its dispute settlement 
and enforcement mechanisms does not absolve its Members from their general and 
continuing obligation to guarantee and protect international human rights norms 
including those to which they have agreed by treaty. In the light of the jurisdic-
tional limitation on the WTO, it has been suggested that the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), a specialised agency of the United Nations and a tripartite 
organisation of governments, employers and union representatives, may be suitable 
for the development and enforcement of human rights in China, an organisation 
which Daniel Ehrenberg regards as the principal international organisation with 
69 Ibid, Art 19(1).
70 Ibid, Art 19(2).
71 United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate 
Body (29 April 1996), WTO Doc.WT/DS2/AB/R, 17.
72 Gabrielle Marceau, “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights” (2002) 13 European Journal 
of International Law 753, 777–78.
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expertise in labour issues.73 Acknowledging that the ILO nonetheless lacks effective 
enforcement mechanisms that may bind States Parties to their treaty obligations 
under its numerous labour conventions,74 Ehrenberg proposes that the ILO and the 
WTO, with the latter’s compulsory disputes settlement and enforcement mecha-
nisms, should be merged such that adherence to international human rights and 
labour rights and standards may be sought and assured in respect of the production 
of such goods as another WTO Member may import. Believing that such ‘syner-
gistic’ collaboration furthermore ‘could be used as a model to demonstrate how 
cooperation between multilateral organizations can be effectively utilized to ef-
fectuate international human rights and labor rights policies, and optimize world 
public order’,75 the author provides detailed guidelines as to how this collaboration 
may proceed.76 In its Singapore Ministerial Declaration, the WTO acknowledges 
likewise the ILO’s competence in the field of labour rights and standards and as-
serts its complementariness with the role and functions of the ILO.77
However, only 21 of the 186 ILO conventions are legally binding on China.78 
China’s realist and instrumental attitudes towards international law, its suppression 
73 Daniel S Ehrenberg, “From Intention to Action: An ILO-GATT/WTO Enforcement Regime for 
International Labor Rights” in Compa and Diamond, supra n 47, pp 163, 163–64.
74 Ibid, 164.
75 Ibid, 165.
76 Ibid, 165–75.
77 World Trade Organisation Singapore Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 13 December 1996, at 
the Ministerial Conference held in Singapore, 36 ILM 218 (1997), states that the WTO ‘[renews] our 
commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core labour standards. The International 
Labour Organization (ILO) is the competent body to set and deal with these standards, and we affi rm 
our support for its work in promoting them. We believe that economic growth and development fos-
tered by increased trade and further trade liberalization contribute to the promotion of these stand-
ards. We reject the use of labour standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative 
advantage of countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put into ques-
tion. In this regard, we note that the WTO and the ILO Secretariats will continue their existing collab-
oration’ (para 4).
78 International Labour Organisation Convention No 11 on Right of Association (Agriculture), 1921, 
ratifi ed by China on 27 April 1934; Convention No 14 on Weekly Rest (Industry), 1921, ratifi ed by 
China on 17 May 1934; Convention No 16 on Medical Examination of Young Persons (Sea), 1921, rat-
ifi ed by China on 2 December 1936; Convention No 19 on Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensa-
tion), 1925, ratifi ed by China on 27 April 1934; Convention No 22 on Seamen’s Articles of Agreement, 
1926, ratifi ed by China on 2 December 1936; Convention No 23 on Repatriation of Seamen, 1926, rat-
ifi ed by China on 2 December 1936; Convention No 26 on Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery, 1928, 
ratifi ed by China on 5 May 1930; Convention No 27 on Marking of Weight (Packages Transported by 
Vessels), 1929, ratifi ed by China on 24 June 1931; Convention No 32 (Revised) on Protection against 
Accidents (Dockers), 1932, ratifi ed by China on 30 November 1935; Convention No 45 on Underground 
Work (Women), 1935, ratifi ed by China on 2 December 1936; Convention No 80 on Final Articles 
Revision, 1946, ratifi ed by China on 4 August 1947; Convention No 100 on Equal Remuneration, 1951, 
ratifi ed by China on 2 November 1990; Convention No 111 on Discrimination (Employment and Occu-
pation), 1958, ratifi ed by China on 12 January 2006; Convention No 122 on Employment Policy, 1964, 
ratifi ed by China on 17 December 1997; Convention No 138 on Minimum Age, 1973, ratifi ed by China 
on 28 April 1999 with obligatory declaration of minimum age at 16 years; Convention No 144 on 
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of an individual’s right of association and, above all, of his or her empowerment 
let alone through a compulsory international enforcement mechanism, as well as 
the fact that the proposed joint enforcement mechanism will require the consent of 
all of the contracting parties to both the WTO and the ILO, all render Ehrenberg’s 
attractive project a defi nite impossibility. Indeed, Michael Trebilcock and Robert 
Howse warn that ‘the attachment of economic sanctions to the powers of the ILO 
may destabilize the organization, causing states to withdraw from membership or 
to withhold ratifi cation of its Conventions to an even greater extent than is the case 
at present.’79
 On the basis of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work80 which states that all Members of the ILO, ‘even if they have not ratifi ed 
the Conventions in question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of mem-
bership in the Organization to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and 
in accordance with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental 
rights which are the subject of those Conventions’,81 Petersmann, nevertheless, 
argues that ‘UN membership entails legal obligations to respect core human rights’82 
and that the rules and principles which ILO conventions and ‘other modern human 
rights instruments’83 have laid down illustrate that there are certain human rights 
that have reached the status of erga omnes obligations of States and intergovern-
mental organisations,84 including the WTO.
As has been explained, unless and until the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
is amended, the WTO is legally incapable of taking into account let alone enforc-
ing rules and principles laid down outside the framework of the Organisation in its 
dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms. Petersmann’s argument fails to 
address the cardinal principle of international law that the consent of the State must 
have been obtained before a particular treaty obligation may be imposed on that 
State, and membership in an intergovernmental organisation such as the United 
 Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards), 1976, ratifi ed by China on 2 November 1990; 
Convention No 150 on Labour Administration, 1978, ratifi ed by China on 7 March 2002; Convention 
No 159 on Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons), 1983, ratifi ed by China on 2 
February 1988; Convention No 167 on Safety and Health in Construction, 1988, ratifi ed by China on 7 
March 2002; Convention No 170 on Chemicals, 1990, ratifi ed by China on 11 January 1995; Conven-
tion No 182 on Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999, ratifi ed by China on 8 August 2002.
79 Michael J Trebilcock and Robert Howse, “Trade Policy & Labor Standards” (2005) 14 Minne-
sota Journal of Global Trade 261, 284.
80 International Labour Organisation Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
and Annex, adopted by the International Labour Organisation General Conference at Geneva on 18 
June 1998, 37 ILM 1233 (1998).
81 Ibid, para 2.
82 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “ “The “Human Rights Approach” Advocated by the UN High Com-
missioner for Human Rights and by the International Labour Organization: Is It Relevant for WTO Law 
and Policy?” (2004) 7 Journal of International Economic Law 605, 634.
83 Ibid, 617.
84 Ibid.
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Nations or the ILO does not in itself constitute such requisite consent to be bound 
by the particular treaties or declarations adopted under the framework of the par-
ticular organisation. In fact, the Annex to the above Declaration specifi cally states 
that the Declaration ‘is of a strictly promotional nature’.85 Petersmann refers to the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,86 the Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action, and ‘[m]any recent studies’87 as the ‘other modern 
human rights instruments’ evidencing that human rights and their underlying val-
ues, including ‘respect for human dignity, life, freedom, equality, property, rule of 
law, procedural justice’, exist ‘in all major cultures and religions’.88 However, 
despite the fact that 190 States have ratifi ed the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, our discussion on Confucianism and the general human rights situation in 
China, together with the United States’ continual refusal to ratify the treaty as well 
as the forbearance of many States Parties including Canada, New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom of corporal punishment, should be suffi cient to demonstrate that 
the rights of the child have not received universal affi rmation. Our discussion on 
Confucianism should also reveal that freedom, equality and the rule of law are alien 
to the Chinese culture. As only States can be Members of the United Nations,89 an 
intergovernmental organisation such as the WTO, which does not form part of the 
structure of the United Nations, is as such also not bound by the United Nations 
Charter to respect human rights or to take into account and enforce these human 
rights in its activities governed by and under its own framework, such as through, 
in Philip Alston’s words, ‘the merger and acquisition of human rights by trade 
law’.90
Meanwhile, human rights advocates ought to give due consideration as to 
whether trade sanctions, which the WTO Panel has described as ‘essentially retal-
iatory in nature’,91 are an appropriate, effective or even lawful means to improving 
the human rights situation in China. It has been noted that in many respects eco-
nomic sanctions are ‘the modern version of siege warfare: each involves the sys-
tematic deprivation of a whole city or nation of economic resources.’92 The goal of 
siege ‘is surrender, not by defeat of the enemy army, but by the fearful spectacle 
85 International Labour Organisation Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and 
Annex, supra n 80, Annex: Follow-up to the Declaration, para 2.
86 Adopted and opened for signature, ratifi cation and accession by UN GA Res 44/25 of 20 Novem-
ber 1989 and entered into force on 2 September 1990.
87 Petersmann, supra n 82, 617, note 35.
88 Ibid.
89 United Nations Charter, Art 4(1).
90 Philip Alston, “Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply 
to Petersmann” (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 815, 829–30.
91 United States–Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities, Report of 
the Panel (17 July 2000), WTO Doc.WT/DS165/R, para 6.23.
92 Joy Gordon, “A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The Ethics of Economic Sanctions” (1999) 13 
Ethics & International Affairs 123, 124.
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of the civilian dead.’93 The imposition of economic sanctions purportedly aiming 
at improving the human rights situation in a country also entails that in the process 
various human rights are undermined or directly violated. As the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in its General Comment No 8 on the rela-
tionship between economic sanctions and respect for economic, social and cultural 
rights94 has emphasised:
the inhabitants of a given country do not forfeit their basic economic, social 
and cultural rights by virtue of any determination that their leaders have vio-
lated norms relating to international peace and security. The aim is not to give 
support or encouragement to such leaders, nor is it to undermine the legitimate 
interests of the international community in enforcing respect for the provisions 
of the Charter of the United Nations and the general principles of international 
law. Rather, it is to insist that lawlessness of one kind should not be met by 
lawlessness of another kind which pays no heed to the fundamental rights that 
underlie and give legitimacy to any such collective action.95
Borrowing from Judge Weeramantry’s dissenting opinion in the International Court 
of Justice’s advisory opinion on the legality of threat or use of nuclear weapons,96 
the underlying rationale behind the imposition of economic sanctions, such as to 
prevent or punish human rights abuses and violations or to improve the general 
human rights situation in a particular country, is immaterial:
It is not to the point that [paraphrase: the harmful results of economic sanc-
tions] are not directly intended, but are ‘by-products’ or ‘collateral damage’ 
caused by [economic sanctions]. Such results are known to be the necessary 
consequences of the use of the weapon. The author of the act causing these 
consequences cannot in any coherent legal system avoid legal responsibility 
for causing them, any less than a man careering in a motor vehicle at a hun-
dred and fi fty kilometres per hour through a crowded market street can avoid 
responsibility for the resulting deaths on the ground that he did not intend to 
kill the particular persons who died.97
One may argue, nevertheless, that economic sanctions may still be necessary as 
they send a message that human rights abuses and violations are unacceptable to 
93 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p 161.
94 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 8: 
The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(12 December 1997), UN Doc.E/C.12/1997/8.
95 Ibid, para 16.
96 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports 1996, 
Vol 1, 226.
97 Ibid, per Judge Weeramantry, 491 (diss op).
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the international community to such an extent as to warrant sanctions. The argu-
ment, however, suffers moral acceptability as it uses the civilian masses to dissuade 
a government from its objectionable policies and treats them as objects and a means 
to an end rather than as an end in itself, in much similar manner as the Chinese 
government does in relation to its population in pursuit of rapid economic develop-
ment and political prestige. Just as it is illegitimate for China to rely on human 
rights abuses and violations that occur in other countries as justification for its poor 
human rights record, it is equally unconvincing for another country or an interna-
tional organisation such as the WTO to rely on China’s poor human rights record 
as justification for the imposition of economic or trade sanctions that essentially 
punish civilians. As Joy Gordon points out:
the existence of wrongdoing does not somehow ‘make’ sanctions come about 
in a way that vitiates the moral agency of institutions imposing them. Nations 
violate international norms quite often; sometimes the international community 
responds to international wrongdoing by military action, diplomatic protest, 
sanctions, or other measures. Sometimes it does nothing. The situation itself 
does not compel any particular response. Indeed, a superpower can violate 
international norms with considerable impunity. For this reason, the nation or 
institution imposing sanctions is still the nation or institution that has imposed 
the deprivation–with choice, with intent, and in the face of other options, rang-
ing from protest to inaction to military invasion.98
Elias Davidsson also argues that in addition to economic, social and cultural rights 
as well as the right to life and freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, 
‘[e]conomic sanctions, unless specifically requested by the population, prevent a 
people from exercising their right to self-determination, the right to freely dispose 
of their natural wealth and resources and the right to development. … Individuals 
living in sanctioned countries are thus singled out for persecution by reason of 
being where they are.’99 A State that imposes economic or trade sanctions with a 
view to improving the human rights situation in China may therefore itself contra-
vene the law of State responsibility, which indicates that countermeasures must not 
affect or derogate from obligations for the protection of fundamental human 
rights.100
The use of sanctions by the WTO with a view to preventing or punishing human 
rights abuses and violations or to improving the general human rights situation in 
a particular Member presents further diffi culties. Whilst it is unlikely that China 
98 Gordon, supra n 92, 132–33.
99 Elias Davidsson, “Legal Boundaries to UN Sanctions” (2003) 7 International Journal of Human 
Rights 1, 41.
100 International Law Commission Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts as annexed to UN GA Res 56/83 of 28 January 2002, Art 50(1)(b).
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will ever face sanctions by the Security Council in respect of its poor human rights 
record, it is equally improbable that the international community, and certainly the 
fi ve Security Council Permanent Members with veto power, will endow yet another 
international body with sanctioning power. In addition, the fact that the WTO 
Agreement ‘is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law’101 
does not mean that the WTO is required to allow the imposition of trade sanctions 
on a particular Member with a view to improving the general human rights situa-
tion within that Member’s jurisdiction. No major human rights treaties demand the 
imposition of economic or trade sanctions in order to have an offending State Par-
ty’s human rights protected or improved, and subject to the Security Council’s 
enforcement powers under Chapter VII, the United Nations Charter specifi cally 
prohibits intervention by the foremost international organisation in the domestic 
affairs of its Members.102
Indeed, Steve Charnovitz questions the rationale of trade sanctions by the WTO, 
arguing that:
it is people who trade, not states. If states did all the trading, then there would 
be no normative problem in approving a state’s request for a trade sanction 
under DSU Article 22 in response to a violation by a trading partner. When it 
is individuals who trade, however, a WTO approval of a trade sanction inter-
feres with voluntary consensual arrangements of individuals on both sides of 
the transaction who may want to complete an exchange without regard to 
whether their governments are obeying WTO rules. Such an action by the WTO 
stands apart from everything else the WTO does and from its focus on mutu-
ally gainful trade.103
Whilst Charnovitz’s reasoning is discerning, it ought to be noted that there are an 
abundance of state-owned and -controlled corporations that are capable of affecting 
the world market and the general conditions of living in goods- and/or services-
importing countries (as illustrated in Russia’s apparent political pressures on 
Ukraine against further alignment with the European Union and the United States 
through cessation in January 2006 of its state-owned and -controlled gas monopo-
ly Gazprom’s gas supplies on which Ukraine relies). Nevertheless, the incident in 
that gloomy European winter precisely reminds us that it is important that the 
multilateral trading system as embodied in the WTO be steadily maintained, for 
compliance with its agreements and decisions is grounded only in its Members’ 
mutual understanding that their respective compliance will be reciprocated; non-
101 United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate 
Body (29 April 1996), WTO Doc.WT/DS2/AB/R, 17.
102 United Nations Charter, Art 2(7).
103 Steve Charnovitz, “Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions” (2001) 95 American Journal of Interna-
tional Law 792, 811.
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compliance brings and breeds non-compliance leading ultimately to the undermin-
ing if not disintegration of the entire system.
Accordingly, as State non-compliance with international human rights norms has 
led us to question their utility and effectiveness, which makes the WTO dispute 
settlement and enforcement mechanisms seemingly so attractive for the develop-
ment and enforcement of human rights because States, it is surmised, care about 
trade, we ought not hastily enlarge the jurisdiction of the WTO with a mandate to 
develop or enforce international human rights norms through the use of its dispute 
settlement and enforcement mechanisms intended solely within the existing frame-
work and rationale of the Organisation, that is, trade, with the end result that nei-
ther human rights nor trade norms would be respected or enforced. 
III. Conclusion
Joost Pauwelyn discerns that ‘in a sense, a “two-class society” does exist, between 
rules of international law that can be judicially enforced before a court with com-
pulsory jurisdiction and those that cannot.’104 Such fragmentation of international 
institutions and international law thus leads us to search for ‘synergistic’ collabora-
tion between international institutions and between sub-systems of international law 
such as has Ehrenberg suggested for the ILO and the WTO. Our last attention 
should, thus, be drawn to this: Is it in fact desirable for the WTO to take into ac-
count and enforcing international human rights norms in its dispute resolution and 
enforcement mechanisms? 
Article 8(1) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding stipulates that only indi-
viduals who are well-qualifi ed in international trade law or policy shall be appointed 
in the composition of WTO Panels, whilst Article 17(3) indicates that only indi-
viduals of recognised authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international 
trade and the subject-matter of the WTO Agreement generally shall be appointed 
to the WTO Appellate Body. It is fair to assume that the prime concern of these 
individuals must be with the liberalisation of trade regulations and the steady func-
tioning of the multilateral trading system, and it is not at all assured that these indi-
viduals will be equally qualifi ed in or concerned about international human rights 
law and its vast jurisprudence and discourse. Assuming arguendo that the WTO 
Panels and Appellate Body were legally not incapable under the WTO Agreement 
of taking into account and enforcing human rights established outside the frame-
work of the WTO, their interpretations of and decisions on these human rights will 
necessarily be based on their members’ understanding of international human rights 
law in the context of their expertise in international trade law or policy and of the 
WTO Agreement, and plausibly may fail to take into account and enforce the con-
text and substance of international human rights law. The end result will inevita-
104 Joost Pauwelyn, “The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?” 
(2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 490, 553.
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bly be that both the sub-systems of international human rights law and of inter -
national trade law are lobotomised.
Furthermore, human rights abuses and violations continue to occur despite 
numerous multilateral treaties and resolutions mandating human rights protection 
and development. Indeed, the prohibition of the use of force continues to be ignored 
despite Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and the United Nations Security 
Council’s sanctioning and enforcement powers under Article 41 and Chapter VII, 
as we saw in the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Israel’s armed hostil-
ity with Lebanon in 2006, and it has not been advocated that the Security Council 
and the United Nations, both of which the United States regards as ineffective and 
irrelevant if the perceived security and interests of the United States are threatened, 
ought therefore to be ignored. At a guest seminar I presented at the Fairbank Cen-
ter for East Asian Research at Harvard University in March 2007, Merle Goldman 
pointed out that although human rights norms can in fact be found within the legal 
framework of the WTO, such as the prohibition against child labour in the 1994 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, they were never resorted to against China 
or any other offending WTO Member. This, to Goldman, proved that human rights 
norms within the WTO framework itself were ineffective if not irrelevant. 
However, whilst human rights treaties may be weak in their enforcement mech-
anisms, their enforcement mechanisms nonetheless exist and should be used at all 
times, if only so that through such use they will be strengthened and empowered. 
The fact that China justifi es instead of denies its violations of human rights trea-
ties demonstrates that the enforcement mechanisms in these human rights treaties 
are still effective and that the validity of international human rights law is recogn-
ised and preserved. Meanwhile, the fact that human rights norms within the WTO 
framework itself have never been resorted to, as Goldman pointed out, should not 
be held to be a failing of the WTO mechanisms either, as it is up to individual 
WTO Members to invoke the WTO dispute settlement and enforcement mecha-
nisms which the WTO cannot invoke on its own motion. We ought to keep in mind 
that by acceding to the WTO, China has voluntarily agreed to, and reinforced, the 
binding force and legitimacy of the human rights norms established within the legal 
framework of the Organisation. 
On the other hand, to rely on the WTO with a view to developing or enforcing 
human rights norms established outside the framework of the Organisation will 
only nullify the enormous international, multilateral and bilateral efforts in the past 
six decades in establishing human rights as valid and authoritative in their own 
right, as international human rights law will in the process be positioned as sub-
sidiary and subject to international trade law. Insistence on the use of the WTO, 
an international organisation founded upon a multilateral treaty in need of enforce-
ment itself, as a device through which human rights treaties and resolutions may 
be enforced is therefore at once both wishful thinking and self-defeating, and we 
must continue, through recourse to international human rights law and international 
human rights bodies, to uphold and strengthen their functions, effectiveness, and 
values in se.
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